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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kenneth Douglas appeals his sentence, arguing that the 
District Court incorrectly held him responsible for trafficking 
more than 450 kilograms of cocaine, erroneously applied 
sentencing enhancements for abuse of a position of trust 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 and obstruction of justice under 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and failed to appropriately consider the 
disparity between his sentence and those imposed on his co-
conspirators.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm 
the sentence with respect to the drug calculation and 
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, but reverse the 





 Douglas participated in a conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine.  The conspiracy began years before he joined it, 
when Tywan Staples, who lived in the San Francisco area, 
began supplying marijuana to his cousin Robert Russell 
Spence in Pittsburgh.  Staples and Spence went from selling 
small amounts of marijuana to shipping four to six kilograms 
of cocaine across the country several times a month.  After 
law enforcement intercepted several packages containing 
money and drugs, the conspirators began using couriers to 
carry drugs and money on commercial flights.  By 2008, six 
different couriers were transporting cocaine out of the 
Oakland, California airport.  After two of the couriers were 
arrested, the conspirators began using San Francisco 
International Airport (“SFIA”) instead.   
 
 Staples, who worked at the “maintenance base” at 
SFIA, knew Douglas, who was an airline mechanic for United 
Airlines.  Douglas had an Airport Operation Authority 
(“AOA”) badge that enabled him to enter the airport terminal 
without being screened at a Transportation Security 
Administration (“TSA”) checkpoint.1  Unlike Douglas, 
Staples did not have the ability to enter the terminal without 
                                                                
 1 Douglas’s supervisor described the way Douglas 
would access the terminal.  To enter the terminal through a 
secured employee entrance, an employee has to use his AOA 
badge as well as place his hand on a biometric scanner.  
However, to leave the terminal, only the AOA badge is 
required.  On a random basis, the TSA would search 




inspection.  For that reason, when Douglas asked Staples if he 
had “any way [Douglas] could make some extra money,” 
Staples invited him to join the conspiracy.  Douglas accepted. 
 
 Staples and Douglas facilitated the movement of 
cocaine in a simple way.  Staples would deliver the cocaine to 
Douglas packed in a bag with clothing.  Douglas would then 
smuggle the bag into the terminal and either transfer it to a 
courier once inside the secured area of the terminal, or board 
the plane as a passenger with the drugs. 
 
 Staples testified that Douglas assisted with the 
movement of the cocaine “40 to 50 times,” transporting ten to 
thirteen kilograms of cocaine on each occasion.  App. 102.  
Douglas transported drugs himself on seventeen occasions.  
Unlike the couriers, he was not required to bring cash back to 
California, so as to avoid any risk of being caught, which 
would, in turn, shut down the conspiracy’s San Francisco 
distribution activities.  Staples testified that Douglas was paid 
$5,000 each time that he smuggled cocaine into the airport, 
and another $5,000 each time he delivered a shipment 
himself.  
 
 Using airline records, the Government identified forty-
six specific flights departing from SFIA between January and 
November of 2009 that were associated with the conspiracy, 
including seventeen flights on which Douglas personally 
transported drugs, sometimes using his employee benefit 
tickets.  These flights included very short round trips that 
were inconsistent with personal travel, and corresponded to 
phone calls among the conspirators, the use of pre-paid credit 




 Following an investigation, a grand jury returned an 
indictment against Douglas and twenty-one co-defendants.  
Douglas was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and conspiracy to 
engage in money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(h).  Douglas was arrested and released on bail, subject 
to several conditions, including travel restrictions and a 
requirement that he appear for court proceedings.  While 
Douglas was on bail, the Probation Office discovered that he 
had booked a flight to Jamaica without permission.  At his 
bail revocation hearing, Douglas claimed he had mistakenly 
booked a flight for himself while booking a flight for his 
wife.  The District Court did not revoke his bail, but modified 
his conditions of release to require him to call probation daily 
to verify his whereabouts. 
 
 Douglas’s trial was scheduled to begin on January 8, 
2014.  He failed to appear for the first day of trial.  The next 
day, he filed a motion for a continuance claiming that he “was 
receiving medical attention on January 8, 2014 and was 
unable [to be] in court for that reason.”  Supp. App. 47.  In 
connection with the motion, Douglas submitted documents 
showing that he was admitted to the emergency room around 
2:00 a.m. on January 8, complaining of chest pain.  The 
records show that he was treated with aspirin and intravenous 
insulin, transported via ambulance to an urgent care facility, 
and had a series of tests in both medical facilities.  Douglas’s 
EKG revealed possible heart blockage, and his blood tests 
indicated he had an abnormal white blood cell count, as well 
as an elevated enzyme level that can be indicative of a heart 
attack.  He received instructions for taking eight over-the-
counter and prescription medications, in addition to the 
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medication he was already taking for diabetes.  Douglas was 
also instructed to schedule follow-up testing and 
appointments with several specialists.  Douglas was also 
given a doctor’s note bearing the time 4:12 p.m. asking that 
he be excused from court on January 8.  
   
 Based on this evidence, the Government argued that it 
was “possible that [Douglas] went there [at] 2:00 in the 
morning faking this illness, so he wouldn’t have to be here 
today.  It is also possible that that was a legitimate illness.  I 
don’t think that anything in the records tells us one way or the 
other.”  App. 388.  Despite the hospital records, the District 
Court stated that “[t]here’s no solid evidence, at least 
presented, that he was suffering from a medical condition that 
warranted him not to appear.  It’s really sort of ambiguous.”  
App. 390–91.  Expressing concern that Douglas would not 
appear for jury selection the following Monday, the District 
Court revoked his bail. 
 
 On January 13, 2014, a jury was selected for the joint 
trial of Douglas and a codefendant, but the next day, 
Douglas’s attorney withdrew, Douglas’s case was severed, 
and his trial was adjourned.  His bail was reinstated but 
modified to require home detention and electronic 
monitoring. 
 
 Douglas obtained new counsel and later waived his 
right to a jury trial.  At the bench trial, the Government 
offered testimony from several coconspirators, law 
enforcement officers, and a United Airlines supervisor.  The 
Government also presented documents corroborating their 
testimony.  Following the trial, the District Court convicted 
Douglas of both charges. 
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 Before sentencing, the Probation Office submitted a 
pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) recommending that 
Douglas be held responsible for 450 kilograms of cocaine, 
resulting in a base offense level of 38.  Applying the grouping 
rules, the PSR recommended a two-level enhancement 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), because Douglas had 
been convicted of conspiracy to engage in money laundering.  
The PSR also recommended a two-level enhancement for 
abuse of a position of trust, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and 
a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, for a total offense level of 44, which is 
treated as a 43, the maximum offense level under the 
Guidelines, which corresponds to a Guidelines sentence of 
life imprisonment.  Douglas objected to the drug quantity as 
well as to the upward adjustments for obstruction of justice 
and abuse of a position of trust. 
 
 At sentencing, the District Court overruled Douglas’s 
objections, citing Staples’s testimony that Douglas smuggled 
between 10 and 13 kilograms of cocaine between 40 and 50 
times, and concluding based on the number of trips that “there 
is ample evidence to show that [he] was responsible for more 
than 450 kilograms of cocaine.”  Supp. App. 236, 393, 403 
(noting that his involvement was not an “anomaly”), 411 
(observing that the evidence against him was 
“overwhelming”).   
 
 The District Court also noted the presence of 
“aggravating factors,” including that Douglas “use[d] [his] 
position of trust with the airlines and, more specifically, [his] 
level of security clearance to aid [him] in being part of th[e] 
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and the amount 
of drugs that . . . [was] transported with [his] assistance was 
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enormous.”  App. 411.  As to the obstruction of justice 
enhancement, the District Court relied upon Douglas’s failure 
to appear on the first day of trial, but made no findings 
beyond those it made in its tentative findings, in which it 
deemed the objection to the enhancement to be “without 
merit.”  Supp. App. 237-47.   
 
 After determining the total offense level to be 43, the 
District Court noted that it had “gone through all of the 3553 
factors[,] [ ] looked at them all to determine a sentence that 
[wa]s sufficient but not greater than necessary,” decided to 
vary downward from the Guidelines sentence of life 
imprisonment, App. 411-12, and imposed a sentence of 240 
months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served 
concurrently, followed by five years of supervised release.  




                                                                
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary review over the 
construction of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves.  
United States v. Greene, 212 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 2000).  
We review the factual determinations underlying a sentence 
for clear error.  “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing body 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) 




 We review sentences for both procedural and 
substantive reasonableness.  United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).   At the first stage, in 
which we review for procedural reasonableness, we seek to 
ensure that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error, such as failing to 
calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain 
the chosen sentence—including an explanation 
for any deviation from the Guidelines range. 
 
Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 50-51 (2007)).  If the district court’s sentencing 
procedure “passes muster, we then, at stage two, consider its 
substantive reasonableness,” based on the totality of the 
circumstances.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  Absent 
significant procedural error, “we will affirm [the sentence as 
substantively reasonable] unless no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on th[e] 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
 
 We will first review Douglas’s challenge to the drug 
quantity calculation and then address his arguments 




 At sentencing, “the government bears the burden of 
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[proving drug quantity] by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 (3d Cir. 1993).  
While “some degree of estimation must be permitted,” United 
States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 998 (3d Cir. 1992), the 
district court must satisfy itself that the evidentiary basis for 
its estimate has sufficient indicia of reliability.  See United 
States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1993) (drug quantity 
estimation based solely on grand jury testimony of single 
drug-addicted witness who had contradicted himself was not 
sufficiently reliable).  “‘Indicia of reliability may come 
from . . . corroboration by or consistency with other evidence 
. . . .’”  United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 722, 732 (7th 
Cir. 2012)).  
 
 The evidence supports the District Court’s factual 
determination that Douglas was responsible for more than 
450 kilograms of cocaine.  Staples testified that Douglas 
smuggled “[10] or 13 kilograms” of cocaine through SFIA 
“40 to 50 times,” App. 102, which totals between 400 and 
650 kilograms of cocaine.  Staples knew the amount of drugs 
because he provided Douglas with the cocaine, and nothing in 
the record suggests that his perception or memory was 
impaired in any way or that he provided inconsistent 
information on this topic.  Cf. Miele, 989 F.2d at 666.   
 
 Furthermore, the Government corroborated Staples’s 
testimony with flight records, telephone toll records, and bank 
deposits.  It identified forty-six flights taken out of SFIA by 
various drug couriers, including Douglas, all of which 
depended on Douglas to smuggle drugs past security into the 
terminal.  Even if each flight involved only the minimum 10 
kilograms of cocaine, this would justify an estimate of over 
11 
 
450 kilograms.  The fact that the number of flights was 
established through circumstantial evidence does not mean 
that reliance on it was error.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 
531 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The quantity of drugs 
attributable to a defendant is a question of fact.  As such, if 
the evidence—direct or circumstantial—supports a district 
court's preponderance determination as to drug quantity, we 
must sustain that finding.”). 
 
   Furthermore, the fact that Douglas used employee 
benefit tickets for some of the trips does not undermine the 
conclusion that the trips were taken for the conspiracy.  
Staples testified that Douglas sometimes used his benefits for 
these flights, despite the fact that doing so was riskier because 
he might be required to wait longer to board a flight.   
 
 Douglas’s argument that cash deposits into his bank 
account could have come from gambling is also unavailing.  
The regularity of the deposits and the correspondence 
between the dates of the deposits and the suspicious flights 
provides a reasonable basis to infer that the flights were 
related to the conspiracy.3 
                                                                
 3 Douglas attempts to argue in the alternative that the 
District Court should have calculated the total drug quantity 
based only on the seventeen flights he personally took 
because the Government presented more specific evidence 
concerning its identification of these flights.  While these 
flights were substantiated in more detail at trial, Staples’s 
testimony, combined with the flight records for the other drug 
couriers and the deposits into Douglas’s bank account, 
provide a sufficient basis for the District Court to conclude 
12 
 
 In sum, Staples’s testimony and the documentary 
evidence provide ample support for the determination that 
Douglas was responsible for more than 450 kilograms of 




 We next address the District Court’s application of a 
two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust.  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 calls for such an enhancement “[i]f the 
defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a 
manner that significantly facilitated the commission or 
concealment of the offense.”  
 
 To determine whether a defendant occupies a position 
of trust for the purposes of § 3B1.3, we consider: “(1) 
whether the position allows the defendant to commit a 
difficult-to-detect wrong; (2) the degree of authority which 
the position vests [in the] defendant vis-à-vis [sic] the object 
of the wrongful act; and (3) whether there has been a reliance 
on the integrity of the person occupying the position.”  United 
States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 
1994)).  We apply these factors mindful of the purpose of the 
enhancement, which is to “punish ‘insiders’ who abuse their 
positions rather than those who take advantage of an available 
opportunity.”  Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192; see also DeMuro, 677 
F.3d at 567-68.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
that Douglas was involved in smuggling drugs approximately 
forty-six, rather than seventeen, times.  
13 
 
 The application note to § 3B1.3 also states that 
positions of trust are “characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment 
that is ordinarily given considerable deference) . . . [and are 
ones that] ordinarily are subject to significantly less 
supervision than employees whose responsibilities are 
primarily non-discretionary in nature.”4  § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.  
                                                                
 4 The full note provides: 
 
‘[p]ublic or private trust’ refers to a position of 
public or private trust characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., 
substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference).  
Persons holding such positions ordinarily are 
subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily 
non-discretionary in nature.  For this adjustment 
to apply, the position of public or private trust 
must have contributed in some significant way 
to facilitating the commission or concealment of 
the offense (e.g., by making the detection of the 
offense or the defendant’s responsibility for the 
offense more difficult).  This adjustment, for 
example, applies in the case of an 
embezzlement of a client’s funds by an attorney 
serving as a guardian, a bank executive’s 
fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual 
abuse of a patient by a physician under the 
guise of an examination.  This adjustment does 
not apply in the case of an embezzlement or 
theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk 
14 
 
Such discretion, however, is not necessarily contingent on the 
defendant holding a professional or managerial job title.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 
2002) (home health aide was in position of trust because she 
opened the victim’s mail and paid bills for her, and “[t]hese 
tasks clearly invested [the aide] with considerable discretion 
since [the victim] did not monitor [her] closely and appeared 
to rely on her judgment and integrity.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 
(2014).  Whatever the defendant’s title, our analysis focuses 
on whether the position grants the defendant the requisite 
degree of discretion “vis-à-vis [sic] the object of the wrongful 
act.”  Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192.5 
                                                                                                                                               
because such positions are not characterized by 
the above-described factors. 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.   
 5 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
uses “a two-step process” wherein a sentencing court must 
“first pos[e] the status question—asking whether the 
[defendant’s] position was characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion and minimal supervision—” before 
moving “to the conduct question” of whether that position 
was abused.  United States v. Parrilla Roman, 485 F.3d 185, 
190-91 (1st Cir. 2007).  Critically, the First Circuit evaluates 
whether a position is one of discretion and minimal 
supervision overall, as opposed to reviewing it in the context 
of the wrong that was committed.  See id. at 192 (reasoning 
that the defendants were not “afforded discretion to establish 
policies or to supervise co-workers” but rather completed 
tasks  “typically required of fleet service clerks (e.g., loading 
and unloading cargo, cleaning cabin interiors, and guiding 
taxiing aircraft),” which “almost invariably require 
15 
 
  The level of discretion vested in a defendant may also 
be influenced by the context in which they perform their 
work.  For instance, defendants who are entrusted with access 
to highly secured areas, such as prison workers, may hold 
positions of trust regardless of their work duties.6  Other 
                                                                                                                                               
oversight”).  Because this approach is so different from the 
Pardo test, we find the First Circuit precedent offered by 
Douglas, holding that airport employees who could bypass 
security did not hold positions of trust, to be largely 
inapposite to our analysis.  See Parrilla Roman, 485 F.3d at 
190-91 (baggage handlers who used their ability to bypass 
airport security to load drugs onto flights undetected were not 
in a position of trust because the mere presence of “security 
clearance . . . cannot transmogrify a menial position into a 
position of trust.”); United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 
395 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Parrilla Roman, and concluding 
that airport janitor who transported drugs into the airport 
using his security clearance lacked the managerial discretion 
needed for a position of trust).   
 6 Courts have warned that the enhancement cannot be 
so expanded as to apply to “every bank teller who has access 
to the bank’s money and every janitor who cleans an office 
where desk drawers are left unlocked.”  United States v. 
Tann, 532 F.3d 868, 870-71, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(defendant who stole money from employer by forging 
checks to herself did not abuse a position of trust because “to 
apply the enhancement to a defendant merely because he or 
she is entrusted with valuable things and has little or no 
supervision while performing his or her duties would stretch 
the abuse-of-trust enhancement to cover endless number of 
jobs involving absolutely no professional or managerial 
discretion, in clear contravention of the plain language of the 
16 
 
courts of appeals have held that prison workers who abuse 
their ability to enter a prison without being searched to 
conspire with inmates and smuggle contraband hold positions 
of trust under § 3B1.3.  See United States v. Gilliam, 315 
F.3d 614, 618 (6th Cir. 2003) (prison counselor who 
smuggled contraband to prisoners); United States v. Brown, 7 
F.3d 1155, 1162 (5th Cir. 1993) (prison food service manager 
who smuggled contraband to inmates); United States v. 
Armstrong, 992 F.2d 171, 172-73 (8th Cir. 1993) (prison 
instructor who solicited inmates to obtain illegal items).  This 
is because “the public places tremendous trust in prison 
employees that they will not conspire with inmates to violate 
the law.”  Gilliam, 315 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks, 
citation, and alteration omitted).   
 
 Because of the paramount public importance of airport 
security, the discretion that comes with security access at an 
airport can be viewed through a similar lens as prisons.  
Airport security in the United States is run by the TSA, a 
government entity created in the aftermath of September 11 to 
ensure the safety of those who fly.  To this end, the TSA 
checks the identification of and searches all passengers.  
Areas that were formerly accessible to nontravelers, such as 
boarding areas, are now off-limits to all but those who have 
cleared security or have security clearances.  Airport security 
is now considered a critical component of national security, 
                                                                                                                                               
commentary to section 3B1.3”) (alteration and citation 
omitted).  As a general matter, we do not disagree with these 
sentiments, but we conclude that Douglas does not fall in the 
same category given the unique trust the public and the 
government place in employees who can bypass TSA security 
restrictions in airports. 
17 
 
and it is axiomatic that government authorities granting 
access to secured areas expect those with such access to act 
with integrity, and that the public trusts airport employees not 
to use their positions to circumvent security measures to 
smuggle weapons or other contraband.  For this reason, an 
airport employee granted a security clearance is reasonably 
viewed as one who occupies a position of public trust that can 
be breached by using his or her position to further a crime.  
See United States v. Higa, 55 F.3d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(leaving undisturbed the § 3B1.3 enhancement imposed on an 
airline customer service representative who “used his position 
with the airline to gain entry into areas where others could 
not” to smuggle drugs) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. 
United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 165 n.6 (2d Cir. 
2011) (applying § 3B1.3 to airline employee on the basis of 
his managerial position of private trust, and declining to 
consider whether the “enhancement was further warranted by 
[his] abuse of a position of public trust, specifically, his abuse 
of access to restricted airport areas, a trust conferred by 
federal . . .  authorities, to facilitate his drug trafficking 
scheme”).7 
 
 Bearing in mind the critical importance of airport 
security, and the expansive nature of Douglas’s access to 
                                                                
 7 Roberts was an airline crew chief charged with 
assigning crews to load and unload airplanes who used this 
position to facilitate drug trafficking.  Roberts, 660 F.3d at 
153-54.  He abused his position by assigning crew members 
who were part of the conspiracy to offload airplanes carrying 
drugs while diverting crews that were not connected to the 
conspiracy to other jobs to prevent them from discovering the 
illicit activity.  Id. 
18 
 
secured areas at SFIA, including the planes themselves, we 
cannot say that the District Court erred in concluding that 
Douglas held a position of public trust.  While the record does 
not indicate that Douglas held a supervisory position or 
disclose the amount of supervision he received when 
performing his mechanic duties, it is evident that he was 
vested with significant discretion, as he was permitted 
unfettered access to planes, which airports go to great lengths 
to protect, screening every passenger who seeks to board 
them and inspecting each bag placed on them.  This freedom 
allowed Douglas to “commit a difficult-to-detect wrong” 
because it permitted him to bypass security measures, 
dramatically reducing the likelihood that luggage containing 
the drugs would be searched.8  Pardo, 25 F.3d at 1192 
(emphasis omitted).  He was vested with discretion in exactly 
the area that related to “the object of the wrongful act”—he 
was able to move freely into the terminal without inspection.  
Id.  Finally, it is reasonable to infer that airport leadership and 
government authorities granted him a security clearance in 
“reliance on [his] integrity,” trusting that he would not abuse 
it to circumvent the purposes of airport security.  Id.   
 
 Douglas’s argument that his job did not relate to 
preventing drug smuggling, and thus did not vest him with 
authority relating to the “object of the wrongful act,” Pardo, 
25 F.3d at 1192, is unpersuasive.  The fact that he was not 
                                                                
 8 That Douglas could have been subjected to random 
searches does not alter this conclusion, as Douglas was still 
trusted to move past security at will without inspection the 
vast majority of the time, which gave him the means to 




specifically tasked with preventing the type of wrong that he 
committed does not undermine the conclusion that he was 
able to commit it as a result of the position of trust he held.  
Like the prison employees who were not specifically tasked 
with preventing contraband from moving through the prisons, 
Douglas took advantage of his largely unfettered access at the 
airport to surreptitiously move contraband, and thereby 
abused his position of public trust.  See Gilliam, 315 F.3d at 
618; Brown, 7 F.3d at 1162; Armstrong, 992 F.2d at 172-73. 
 
 For these reasons, the District Court did not err in 
applying a two-level enhancement to his offense level 




 We next examine the application of the § 3C1.1 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  Section 3C1.1 
provides a two-level increase in the offense level where “the 
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded . . . the 
administration of justice with respect to the . . . prosecution . . 
. of the instant offense of conviction, and [ ] the obstructive 
conduct related to  . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction . 
. . .”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  “[W]illfully failing to appear, as 
ordered, for a judicial proceeding” is covered conduct.  Id. § 
3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E).  “Willfully” in this context means 
“deliberately or intentionally; in other words, not negligently, 
inadvertently, or accidentally.”  United States v. Jenkins, 275 
F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The word “willful . . .  when used in a criminal 
statute . . .  generally means an act done with a bad purpose.”  
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 965 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The government bears the 
20 
 
burden of proving that the defendant “willfully obstructed or 
impeded . . . the administration of justice” by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  Id. 
 
 The District Court adopted the PSR’s recommendation 
to impose the obstruction of justice enhancement based on 
Douglas’s “fail[ure] to appear for trial on January 8, 2014.”  
PSR ¶ 27.  During the hearing addressing his failure to 
appear, the District Court was provided with medical records 
and informed that Douglas had been in the hospital.  The 
District Court considered the records and arguments and said 
that “[t]here’s no solid evidence, at least presented, that he 
was suffering from a medical condition that warranted him 
not to appear.  It’s really sort of ambiguous.”  App. 390-91.  
As a result, the District Court concluded that there was a 
“substantial risk” that Douglas would not appear at trial and 
thereby disrupt the administration of justice.  App. 391.  In 
connection with sentencing, the District Court relied on these 
facts to impose the § 3C1.1 enhancement, making no 
additional factual findings on the subject, and declared the 
objection to the enhancement to be “without merit.” 9  Supp. 
App. 236. 
                                                                
 9 At the sentencing hearing, the District Court 
requested clarification for the basis on which the Government 
sought the enhancement, asking that it “[b]e more specific 
with regard to obstruction” and whether its basis was 
“[f]ailure to appear for court.”  App. 407.  The Government 
said it was but also listed several allegedly false statements 
Douglas made that caused law enforcement to waste 
investigatory effort.  Douglas’s attorney then stated that he 
had been under the impression the obstruction of justice 
enhancement “was predicated on failure to appear for trial.”  
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   Douglas asserts that the District Court erred in 
imposing the enhancement.  He points out that he provided a 
medical explanation for his absence from trial, notes that the 
District Court made no findings that he willfully failed to 
appear for trial, and argues that the subsequent reinstatement 
of his bail and the granting of travel requests shows that the 
District Court “did not find that the Appellant’s failure to 
appear on his jury selection date was willful.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 35. 
 
 While there is no question that Douglas was aware of 
the date of trial and he intentionally did not appear in court, 
the record does not show that he willfully failed to appear.  
Douglas provided medical documentation that explained his 
absence.  These records show that he awoke the morning of 
trial with chest pain and went to the emergency room at 2:00 
a.m., underwent tests showing a possible heart blockage, 
abnormal white blood cell count, and elevated heart enzyme 
levels, and was treated with insulin and aspirin.  His 
complaints were taken seriously, as reflected by the fact that 
he was transported by ambulance to the hospital’s urgent care 
facility for tests.  Most significantly, the documentation 
included a page entitled “verification of treatment” signed by 
a medical doctor at 4:12 p.m. on January 8, 2014, which 
stated that Douglas received care and requested that the court 
“[p]lease excuse Mr. Douglas’ absence from court today.”  
Given this documentation, we are unable to determine why 
                                                                                                                                               
App. 408.  The Government repeated that there were multiple 
reasons but that “[b]oth the probation office and [the Court] 
already ruled on them.” App. 408-09.  The District Court then 
stated “I agree. That matter has already been thoroughly 
covered.  The Court has ruled on it.”  App. 409. 
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the District Court viewed his medical excuse skeptically or 
described the documentation as “ambiguous.”  App. 391.   
 
 Moreover, the Government bears the burden of proof 
and offered no evidence to show Douglas’s conduct was 
willful, in the sense that Douglas deliberately schemed not to 
appear in court by feigning illness.  See United States v. 
Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 195-97 (3d Cir. 2007) (five mental 
health evaluations showed defendant was feigning a mental 
illness to avoid being found competent).  In fact, during the 
bail review hearing the Government stated it was “possible 
that he went to the [hospital] faking this illness, so he would 
not have to be here.  It is also possible that that was a 
legitimate illness.  I don’t think that anything in the records 
tell us one way or the other.”  App.  388.  The Government 
therefore viewed the record as being in equipoise.  This is not 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Douglas 
willfully failed to appear.  Absent such proof from the 
Government showing willfulness, and in light of the medical 
documentation presented indicating a lack of willfulness, the 
application of a § 3C1.1 enhancement was improper.10   
                                                                
 10 Because we will remand for resentencing due to the 
erroneous application of the enhancement, we need not 
address the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  
United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010).  
We do note, however, that with respect to substantive 
reasonableness, Douglas argued only that the District Court 
did not consider § 3553(a)(6)’s mandate that courts avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among codefendants.  He 
asserts that his 240-month sentence is excessive in 
comparison with his coconspirators who he claims held 
managerial roles and participated in the conspiracy for a 
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 By improperly applying the obstruction of justice 
enhancement, the District Court did not accurately calculate 
Douglas’s Guidelines range.  See United States v. Wright, 
642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that the application 
of sentence enhancements is used in calculating a defendant’s 
Guidelines range).  Failure to make a “correct computation of 
the Guidelines range” constitutes procedural error.  Id. (citing 
United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
 
 Here, Douglas’s total offense level with the 
enhancement was 43, which corresponds to life 
imprisonment.  Without the § 3C1.1 enhancement, Douglas’s 
total offense level corresponds to 360 months to life 
imprisonment.  Ultimately, the District Court applied a 
downward variance and imposed a sentence of 240 months.  
While the District Court may still have imposed a sentence of 
240 months absent the § 3C1.1 enhancement, we cannot be 
sure.  See, e.g., Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d at 446 (“[W]e 
cannot be sure that the district court would have imposed the 
                                                                                                                                               
longer time.  Putting aside the fact that Douglas was a 
lynchpin of the conspiracy’s San Francisco activities and that 
he played a more significant role than other conspirators, and 
thus he does not share “exactly parallel[ ]” circumstances 
with them, United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 161 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2008), his parity complaint would not entitle him to 
any relief.  “Congress’s primary goal in enacting § 3553(a)(6) 
was to promote national uniformity in sentencing rather than 
uniformity among co-defendants in the same case.”  United 
States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  As a 
result, Douglas “cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek a 
reduced sentence” based on alleged disparity between his 
sentence and those imposed on his co-defendants.  Id.    
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same sentence if not for the error.”); Langford, 516 F.3d at 
219 (“[This] is not that rare case where we can be sure that an 
erroneous Guidelines calculation did not affect the sentencing 
process and the sentence ultimately imposed.”); see also 
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 
(2016) (“When a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect 
Guidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate 
sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, 
and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome absent the error.”).  We 
will therefore reverse the application of the § 3C1.1 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s conclusion regarding drug quantity and its application 
of the enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, reverse 




  USA v. DOUGLAS, 15-1754 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, 
 The Sentencing Guidelines are meant to constrain 
judicial discretion, focusing and channeling decisions about 
criminal punishment in order to provide consistent, 
disciplined conclusions.  I fear that my colleagues have shed 
those constraints.  By disregarding the binding source of law 
here—the Sentencing Guidelines themselves—the majority 
has left the abuse of a position of public trust enhancement 
without limits on its scope.  The Guidelines, and our 
consistent precedent in applying them, delineate particular 
sorts of abuse of trust which trigger this enhancement.  The 
majority’s interpretation sweeps those textual and 
precedential distinctions away, rendering the enhancement 
indiscriminately applicable to a panoply of criminal actors.  I 
am compelled to dissent.1 
 Some violations of trust—but not all—are crimes.  
And when they are crimes, violations of trust are 
sometimes—but not always—subject to increased 
punishment.  The Sentencing Guidelines provide a two-level 
enhancement for defendants who “abused a position of public 
or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated 
the commission or concealment of the offense.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.3.  In this case, Douglas undoubtedly violated the trust 
placed in him by his employer, by the airport, and implicitly 
by the traveling public.  The majority rightfully recoils at that 
breach.  But Douglas’s crime did not abuse a position of trust, 
                                              
1 I join Parts I, II.A, and II.C of the majority opinion.  
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as defined by the Guidelines, and it is the Guidelines we are 
called upon to apply here.2 
 I begin my analysis of § 3B1.3 with the text of the 
Guideline and its accompanying note.  The commentary to 
the Guidelines is authoritative and must be given “controlling 
weight” unless plainly erroneous or in violation of the 
Constitution or a federal statute.  United States v. Keller, 666 
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Stinson v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993)).  The commentary to the 
Guidelines are binding on federal courts and supersede even 
prior judicial interpretations of the Guidelines.  Id.  Note 1 to 
Guidelines § 3B1.3—worth quoting in full—provides that: 
“Public or private trust” refers to a position of 
public or private trust characterized by 
professional or managerial discretion (i.e., 
substantial discretionary judgment that is 
ordinarily given considerable deference). 
Persons holding such positions ordinarily are 
subject to significantly less supervision than 
employees whose responsibilities are primarily 
non-discretionary in nature. For this adjustment 
to apply, the position of public or private trust 
must have contributed in some significant way 
to facilitating the commission or concealment of 
the offense (e.g., by making the detection of the 
offense or the defendant's responsibility for the 
offense more difficult). This adjustment, for 
example, applies in the case of an 
                                              
2 This conduct could, of course, be considered as part of the 
sentencing court’s analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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embezzlement of a client’s funds by an attorney 
serving as a guardian, a bank executive’s 
fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual 
abuse of a patient by a physician under the 
guise of an examination. This adjustment does 
not apply in the case of an embezzlement or 
theft by an ordinary bank teller or hotel clerk 
because such positions are not characterized by 
the above-described factors.  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, Note 1.  
 The plain meaning of this Note makes clear that the 
sentencing enhancement is not meant to apply to cases like 
this one.  The Sentencing Commission limited the 
enhancement to the abuse of positions characterized by 
“professional or managerial discretion.”  The majority would 
write these terms out of the Guidelines entirely.  After 
correctly observing that those without professional or 
managerial job titles can nevertheless abuse positions of trust, 
the majority goes further than the Guidelines allow, reducing 
the analysis only to whether the defendant has discretion “vis-
à-vis the object of the wrongful act.”  Maj. Slip. Op. at 13 
(citing United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1192 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Never again does the majority ask nor mention 
whether that discretion is the variety specified by the 
Guidelines: professional or managerial discretion.  These 
terms modify the word “discretion” and must be given effect.  
See United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 
1989) (applying rule against superfluities to Sentencing 
Guidelines).  Any interpretation of § 3B1.3 that provides an 
enhancement for discretion generally, rather than only 
professional or managerial discretion, is broader than what 
the Guidelines provide. 
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 Nor does the majority address the remainder of the 
Note.  The Sentencing Commission further explained exactly 
what sort of discretion characterizes a position of trust: 
“substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given 
considerable deference.”  Deference is at the core of the 
Guidelines’ definition of a position of trust, but is nowhere to 
be found in this case.  The paradigmatic examples of 
positions of trust provided for by the Sentencing Commission 
are characterized by this sort of deference.  A patient defers to 
a doctor’s medical expertise and allows him to set a course of 
treatment; she substitutes his judgment for her own.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.3, Note 1.  In “the case of an embezzlement of a 
client’s funds by an attorney serving as a guardian,” the client 
has delegated financial decisionmaking to his attorney; her 
embezzlement relies on that substitution of judgment.  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, Note 1.   
 Who defers to Douglas’s discretionary judgments?  No 
one.  The majority asserts that Douglas’s discretion was 
manifest in his ability “to move freely into the terminal 
without inspection.”  Maj. Slip. Op. at 16.  But that freedom 
of movement pertains to Douglas himself.  He did not 
exercise decisionmaking power on behalf of others who 
deferred to his position or expertise.  This is not the kind of 
discretion specified by the Guidelines. 
 In fact, Douglas is more akin to the “ordinary bank 
teller or hotel clerk” whom the Guidelines expressly specify 
are not covered.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, Note 1.  A bank teller has 
physical access to highly sensitive locations—cash tills, 
vaults, perhaps safe deposit boxes—and may be permitted to 
move through the bank freely, without inspection.  But bank 
tellers are not subject to the abuse of a position of trust 
enhancement.  Freedom of movement is a form of discretion, 
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but it is not the managerial or professional discretion that is 
subject to this enhancement.   
 The history of § 3B1.3 only underscores the 
importance of these provisions.  Prior to a set of 1993 
amendments, Note 1 provided only that “The position of trust 
must have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating 
the crime and not merely have provided an opportunity that 
could as easily have been afforded to other persons.  This 
adjustment, for example, would not apply to an 
embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 
note (Historical Notes, 1993 Amendments).  The Sentencing 
Commission added its discussion of “professional or 
managerial discretion” and of deference to the defendant’s 
judgment to its Commentary in 1993.  These qualifications 
cannot be ignored, minimized, or flattened into a general 
discussion of abuse of trust; the Commission acted 
specifically to include them.3  Cf. Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 
386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we 
presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial 
effect.”).  
                                              
3 Other courts have recognized that the specific addition of 
these terms “places a significant limit on the types of 
positions subject to the abuse-of-trust enhancement,” even 
compared to the pre-1993 version of the statute.  United 
States v. West, 56 F.3d 216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  See also 
United States v. Contreras, 581 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 
2009), opinion adopted in part, vacated in part, 593 F.3d 
1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (comparing pre- and post-
amendment tests).  
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 In addition to the express terms of Note 1, the 
provisions of Note 2 offer further reason not to apply the 
§ 3B1.3 sentencing enhancement to Douglas.  Note 2 
provides that “[n]otwithstanding Application Note 1 . . . an 
adjustment under this guideline shall apply to the following.”  
It then lists specific contexts in which physical access suffices 
for § 3B1.3 to apply, including cases in which postal workers 
engage in the theft or destruction of undelivered mail or in 
which defendants abuse their position to obtain identification 
information, as when a hospital orderly misappropriates 
information from a patient’s chart.  § 3B1.3 Note 2.  Thus, 
Note 2 carves out certain exceptions in which the 
enhancement applies where it would not otherwise.  Were 
these low-level workers covered by the definitions in Note 1, 
there would be no cause to single them out separately in Note 
2.   
 The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
instructs us that because the Sentencing Commission singled 
out two areas where low-level workers who abuse their 
physical access are subject to the enhancement—theft of mail 
by postal workers and identity theft—the Commission did not 
mean to cover other low-level employees who abuse their 
physical access.  See United States v. Jankowski, 194 F.3d 
878, 884 (8th Cir. 1999) (“the enhancement for postal 
employees is an exception to the general definition as stated 
in the first paragraph of note 1. . . the exception is limited and 
meant only to protect the delivery of the mail.”)   
 Airports may be, as the majority writes, a special and 
sensitive context, in which all employees are held to a higher 
standard.  If so, the Sentencing Commission has the power to 
single out airport employees for coverage based only on 
access, just as it did postal workers.  But the Sentencing 
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Commission did not do so.  The Sentencing Commission 
singled out postal workers.4  It is not for the courts to impose 
their own substantive beliefs in place of those of the expert 
body tasked with preparing the Guidelines.  Cf. Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379, 393 (describing Sentencing 
Commission as “expert body” making “political 
judgment[s].”); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1015 
(3d Cir. 1988) (comparing Commission’s “extrajudicial task 
of delegated substantive rulemaking” with “judicial function” 
of imposing sentences).  
 We are bound to follow the Sentencing Commission’s 
notes in interpreting the Guidelines.  United States v. Savani, 
733 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2013) (“guidelines commentary, 
interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline, is 
binding on us when we are applying that guideline because 
we are obligated to adhere to the Commission’s definition”).  
The majority, however, barely engages with the Guidelines’ 
text.  Rather, their analysis rests almost entirely on the 
judicially-created tests we have previously elaborated.  I do 
not believe that the text of the Guidelines allows us to impose 
the § 3B1.3 sentencing enhancement on Douglas.  If our 
precedent compelled such an outcome, I would conclude that 
our precedent needed to be brought into line with the 
authoritative interpretations set forth in the notes to the 
Guidelines.  But our cases are entirely consistent with the 
principles set forth above – at least until now.  
                                              
4 Identity theft was added in 2005 amendments, in response to 
a new statutory mandate.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 note (Historical 
Notes, 2005 Amendments).  See Identity Theft Penalty 
Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004).   
8 
 
 The majority laid out the three-part Pardo test which 
structures our determination of whether a defendant occupies 
a position of trust.  United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 
1192 (3d Cir. 1994).  And the majority properly noted that 
this test must be applied purposively, steered by the “guiding 
rationale of the section—to punish ‘insiders' who abuse their 
position rather than those who take advantage of an available 
opportunity.”  Id.  See also United States v. DeMuro, 677 
F.3d 550, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2012) (restating standard).   
 However, the majority failed to heed its own 
admonition about the section’s purpose.  Indeed, at one point 
the majority summed up Douglas’s crime by stating that he 
“took advantage of his largely unfettered access at the airport 
to surreptitiously move contraband.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 17.  
While we eschew “magic words” formalisms in our analysis, 
it is revealing that the majority described Douglas using 
precisely the language that our precedent uses to describe 
when § 3B1.3 is inapplicable.  Douglas did, in fact, only “take 
advantage” of an opportunity for criminality.  For this reason, 
§ 3B1.3 does not cover him. 
 Our jurisprudence has also consistently recognized that 
the § 3B1.3 sentencing enhancement only applies in the 
specific context laid out in the Guidelines.  For example, we 
have described the enhancement as applying to 
“relationships.”  DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 568 (including “a 
mother/daughter relationship and a babysitter/child 
relationship” as well as a parishioner/church advisor 
relationship (citations omitted)).  Positions of trust, under the 
Guidelines, are relational, existing between defendants and 
those who defer to their judgment.   
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 Likewise, although we do not limit the enhancement to 
“formal” fiduciary relationships, we routinely ask whether 
relationships were “analogous to the fiduciary relationship” or 
“fiduciary-like.”  United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 225 
(3d Cir. 1999).  See also United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 
171, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (“It was this fiduciary position that 
Bennett occupied . . . that caused the District Court to find 
Bennett held a position of trust relative to his victims.”); 
United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 413 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“Sokolow argues that no fiduciary relationship existed with 
NIBA members in connection with the submission of 
premiums. . . . We disagree.”).   
 We have also looked specifically for professional or 
managerial discretion, in the particular sense provided for by 
the Guidelines: that clients defer to the considered judgment 
of the defendant, who operates outside effective supervision.  
See United States v. Babaria, 775 F.3d 593, 597 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“there was no one supervising Dr. Babaria’s position 
as the medical director and manager of Orange”); United 
States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 425 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“Kennedy’s claim that neither Ursuline nor its clients placed 
special reliance upon her is specious because she was 
responsible for managing her clients' finances.”) (emphasis 
added); United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 377 (3d Cir. 
2001) (categorizing stockbrokers based on discretion to freely 
trade granted by their customers, and assessing § 3B1.3 
applicability accordingly); Iannone, 184 F.3d at 225 
(describing defendant’s managerial position); United States v. 
Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 206 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Nathan held the 
highest position in the company”); United States v. Sherman, 
160 F.3d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding physicians not 
subject to effective supervision because of “their education 
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and training and analysis . . . inherent in the profession”); 
Bennett, 161 F.3d at 196 (defendant “exercised unlimited 
managerial discretion over the organizations and their 
staffs”).   
 Indeed, the only case the majority cites with respect to 
the nature of professional or managerial discretion, United 
States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 2002), involved 
a home health aide who used her influence over her elderly 
patient, who “appeared to rely on her judgment and integrity,” 
in order to fraudulently cash checks.  The aide was 
empowered to open her patient’s mail “without supervision” 
and was given “authority to pay bills for her.”  Id.  While a 
home health aide is not inherently trusted with professional 
discretion like a doctor or attorney might be, we found that 
this particular home health aide was given the same power to 
substitute her judgment for that of her ward.   
 Douglas’s crime displays none of the features that we 
have looked for in our past applications of § 3B1.3.  His 
criminal behavior is not rooted in any particular trust-based 
relationship akin to doctor/patient or parent/child.  He owed 
no fiduciary obligation to the airline, airport or public, nor 
even something analogous to a fiduciary obligation.  He was 
not supposed to place any third party’s interests above his 
own, nor did he imply that he would do so.  Rather, his 
obligations were those of everyone else: not to smuggle 
drugs.  And the record does not show Douglas exercising 
managerial or professional discretion, whether by operating at 
the top of his company’s organization chart or by deploying 
specialized knowledge not easily second-guessed.   
 All our past cases comport with the text of § 3B1.3, 
emphasizing that the abuse of a position of trust must always 
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involve a relationship of deference.  We have never before 
found mere physical access, even in a restricted setting, to 
demonstrate a position of trust.  We should not do so here. 
 Bearing this in mind, a proper application of the Pardo 
three-part test should not cover Douglas’s behavior.  I agree 
with the majority that his ability to move through the airport 
with limited security screening enabled him to “commit a 
difficult-to-detect wrong,” the first Pardo factor.  Pardo, 25 
F.3d at 1192. 
 But Douglas lacked “authority . . . vis-à-vis the object 
of the wrongful act.”  Id.  In Pardo, we observed that the 
defendant “had no authority over anyone or anything.”  Id.  
Authority means more than simply the right to be somewhere.  
Authority, as we recognized, is exercised with respect to 
another, who is ordered, controlled, or affected by that 
authority.  See Authority, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014) (“1. The official right or permission to act, esp. to act 
legally on another’s behalf . . . the power delegated by a 
principal to an agent.”).  Like Pardo, Douglas did not have 
authority over someone or something other than himself, even 
if he had certain privileges within the airport.   
 As for the third factor, “whether there has been 
reliance on the integrity of the person occupying the 
position,” the record offers little information.  Pardo, 25 F.3d 
at 1192.  The majority claims that we can infer that the airport 
and government authorities trusted Douglas because they 
granted him a security clearance.  Maj. Slip. Op. at 16.  This 
is tautological.  If this were the test, then every cashier given 
access to a register would have been hired in “reliance on 
[his] integrity.”  All employers must trust their employees to 
some extent; the third Pardo factor asks how and why that 
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trust is manifested. Properly understood, this third factor 
contrasts those who can be trusted due to their independent 
professional obligations or their own personal virtues from 
those who can only be trusted if supervised or regulated.  Cf. 
Iannone, 184 F.3d at 225 (finding third factor met because 
victims relied on “resume listing years of experience,” 
“posing as a decorated Vietnam veteran,” and “perceived 
integrity as owner and CEO.”); Sherman, 160 F.3d at 970 
(“[T]he insurance company relied on the integrity of Sherman 
as a doctor holding a medical license.”).   
 As the majority admits, the record simply does not 
disclose what supervision Douglas received as a mechanic – 
nor does it demonstrate what factors secured Douglas his 
access to the airport.  This is insufficient to determine 
whether he was trusted because of his integrity, or simply 
because an airline has no option other than to trust someone 
to fix their aircrafts.5  The third Pardo factor, therefore, 
cannot support the application of the § 3B1.3 sentencing 
enhancement.  
 The experience of other courts of appeals supports this 
conclusion.  As the D.C. Circuit has stated, Douglas “may 
have occupied a position of trust in the colloquial sense that 
[he] was trusted not to use [his] access for nefarious purposes; 
in that sense, so is every bank teller who has access to the 
                                              
5 Of course, this analysis would be entirely different had 
Douglas used his expertise as a mechanic to somehow 
purposefully damage or endanger the safety or integrity of an 
aircraft.  Such a circumstance might more logically be 
denoted an abuse of a position of trust pursuant to the 
Guidelines.   
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bank’s money and every janitor who cleans an office where 
desk drawers are left unlocked.”  United States v. Tann, 532 
F.3d 868, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  See also United States v. 
Edwards, 325 F.3d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (“the fact that 
Ms. Edwards was trusted by her employer with significant 
responsibility-even to the point of allowing her to bypass 
usual accounting controls and pick up customer checks from 
incoming mail-is not determinative.”).   
The majority distinguishes Tann based upon “the public 
safety dimension” of airport employment, “the nature of the 
access he had, and how he used it.”  Maj. Slip. Op. at 14 n.6.  
Put simply, they assert that airports are special, such that 
physical access across an airport per se converts a job into a 
position of public trust.  Without minimizing the importance 
of airport security, I cannot agree.  There is simply no 
limiting principle.   
 As noted by the majority, airport security took on new 
significance in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the 
deadliest terrorist incident in American history.  The second 
deadliest terrorist attack was the Oklahoma City bombing, 
which took place at a federal office building.  Associated 
Press, Service Held to Mark 20 Years since Oklahoma City 
Bombing, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 19, 2015. Are we to hold that 
anyone with security access to a large office building—say a 
janitor trafficking in drugs in the building’s basement—also 
holds a position of trust?  What about those with access to 
subway systems, nightclubs, hotels, or schools—all sites of 
recent mass violence?  Deciding that certain large facilities 
are so important that everyone in them holds a position of 
trust is a policy determination, one properly left to the 
Sentencing Commission or Congress.  As already noted, the 
Commission has singled out certain institutions as per se 
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involving the public trust—most notably the mail—and 
airports are not among them.  
 The only reasoned opinions addressing whether access 
to secured areas of an airport makes a position one of public 
trust, both from the First Circuit, have found that airport 
employment must be subjected to the same “professional or 
managerial discretion” analysis as any other job.  United 
States v. Parrilla Roman, 485 F.3d 185, 190-91 (1st Cir. 
2007) (involving airport baggage handlers who helped 
smuggle drugs); United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 395 
(1st Cir. 2009) (involving airport janitor who helped smuggle 
drugs).  The majority suggests that the First Circuit’s 
approach to § 3B1.3 diverges so greatly from our own that 
these cases are entirely inapposite.  I am unpersuaded.6  But 
regardless of the differences or similarities between our tests, 
the First Circuit opinions have at least some persuasive 
                                              
6 According to the majority, the First Circuit uses a “two-step 
process” that asks first the “status question” of whether the 
defendant’s position was characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion and only then asks the “conduct 
question” of whether that position was abused.  Parrilla 
Roman, 485 F.3d at 190-91.  But our own Court has held that 
“[i]n applying § 3B1.3, a court must initially determine 
whether the defendant occupied a position of public or private 
trust. If he did occupy such a position, then the court must 
determine whether the defendant abused this position of trust 
in a way that significantly facilitated his crime.”  Iannone, 
184 F.3d at 222.  If our two-step inquiry is distinct from that 
of the First Circuit, it is a distinction without any substantial 
difference.  Certainly, our tests are similar enough that we can 
learn from the First Circuit’s reasoning.  
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power, for at the end of the day, they interpret the same 
Guideline.   
 The First Circuit looked to see whether the defendants 
could establish policies or supervise co-workers and whether 
they were in fact unsupervised.  Parrilla Roman, 485 F.3d at 
192.  The First Circuit hewed to the instructions of the 
Guidelines and focused on professional and managerial 
discretion; the majority here fails entirely to engage with 
these issues.  Likewise, the First Circuit properly 
distinguished between mere physical access—the same 
privileges enjoyed by bank tellers—and authority.  As they 
held, “the security clearance awarded to [defendant] cannot 
transmogrify a menial position into a position of trust.”  Id. at 
191. 
 The other airport cases cited by the majority do not 
carry any persuasive weight as to whether § 3B1.3 applies to 
anyone abusing their security access to an airport.  The 
Second Circuit expressly declined to consider “whether a 
§ 3B1.3 enhancement was further warranted by Roberts’s 
abuse of a position of public trust, specifically, his abuse of 
access to restricted airport areas, a trust conferred by federal 
CBP [Customs and Border Patrol] authorities, to facilitate his 
drug trafficking scheme.”  United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 
149, 165 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011).  As the majority correctly notes, 
the enhancement was applied to Roberts on the basis of his 
abuse of the private trust imparted to him by the airline.  He 
served in a managerial position, assigning employees under 
his supervision to load airplanes.  He used this managerial 
power to further his drug trafficking operation by assigning 
those who were part of the scheme to unload airplanes with 
drugs and keeping away those who were not in on the 
operation.  Roberts, 660 F.3d at 153-54.  This supervisory 
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role serves as a valuable contrast to Douglas’s case, where no 
such managerial powers were employed.   
 The Ninth Circuit has upheld the application of 
§ 3B1.3 to an airline customer service representative who, to 
further a drug conspiracy, “used his position with the airline 
to ‘gain entry into areas where others could not.’”  United 
States v. Higa, 55 F.3d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1995).  But the 
Ninth Circuit did not seriously engage with this question; its 
cursory treatment was focused on whether the defendant’s 
acquittal on two counts precluded the application of § 3B1.3 
on two other offenses.  Id.  Unlike the First Circuit’s analysis, 
which engages with the substance of the Guidelines, Higa 
lacks any power to persuade on this issue. 
 In support of its contention that certain institutions are 
so sensitive that anyone with access can be found to be in a 
position of trust with respect to the general public, the 
majority cites a trio of cases—all from outside this circuit—
concerning prison staff.  These involve a drug counselor who 
attempted to buy cocaine from his counselee, United States v. 
Gilliam, 315 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2003); a food manager who 
participated in a scheme to alter money orders, United States 
v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155 (5th Cir. 1993); and a prison instructor 
who conspired with inmates to manufacture and pass 
counterfeit bills, United States v. Armstrong, 992 F.2d 171 
(8th Cir. 1993).   
 As the majority observes, these cases do appear to 
carve out a special status for prisons, based on the public’s 
“right to expect and trust that those in the employ of the 
government for the purpose of rehabilitating criminals will 
refrain from entering into the kind of criminal enterprises that 
necessitated such rehabilitation in the first place.”  Gilliam, 
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315 F.3d at 619.  This is true as far as it goes.  Other courts 
(not ours) have found that one context (not airports) should be 
treated specially under § 3B1.3.   
 But our sister circuits are far from uniform in their 
application of § 3B1.3 to prison staff.  The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, rejected the application of § 3B1.3 to a prison cook 
who enjoyed access to inmates without being required to be 
thoroughly searched upon entry.  United States v. Contreras, 
581 F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2009), opinion adopted in 
part, vacated in part, 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc).  The Eleventh Circuit decided likewise in another case 
involving a food service worker granted access to the prison 
without searches, observing that a contrary reading would 
“extend to virtually every employment situation because 
employers ‘trust’ their employees.”  United States v. Long, 
122 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 1997).   
 Moreover, the grounds on which prisons have been 
singled out do not extend to airports.  The Gilliam counselor 
was supposed to help inmates avoid drug abuse; instead, he 
recruited them into a trafficking scheme.  Gilliam, 315 F.3d at 
617.  He violated his specific duties to the public and those 
under his care.  In contrast, airline mechanics have no greater 
obligation to prevent drug smuggling than anyone else.  In 
Armstrong, the court analogized correctional officials to 
police officers, on whom abuse of trust enhancements are 
routinely and easily applied.  992 F.2d at 173.  Cf. United 
States v. Brann, 990 F.2d 98, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Needless to say, a police officer occupies a position of 
public trust, and the commission of a crime by a police officer 
constitutes an abuse of that trust. . .” (internal citations 
omitted)).  Does it behoove us to equate airline mechanics 
with law enforcement officers in our jurisprudence?   
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 It is also well-established that prisons are a “unique 
context.”  Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 541 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
642 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing “unique 
institutional concerns that arise in the prison setting”).  The 
fact that some courts have taken prisons out from the ordinary 
§ 3B1.3 analysis does not mean that we should single out 
airports.   
 I cannot take fault with the majority’s conviction that 
Douglas violated the trust placed in him by the traveling 
public.  An airplane mechanic’s ability to walk contraband 
onto a commercial flight threatens the confidence we each try 
to maintain in the security of our aviation system.  But not 
every violation of trust, in that everyday sense, triggers the 
sentencing enhancement of § 3B1.3.  The Sentencing 
Commission has specified that only certain acts—those 
violating positions of trust characterized by professional or 
managerial discretion and by deference to the defendant’s 
judgment rather than abuse of his access—qualify.  Douglas’s 
acts do not.   
 I am compelled to dissent because the majority’s 
departure from both the Guidelines and our own precedent 
leaves us without any principled limitation on the scope of 
§ 3B1.3.  Under the majority’s approach, I see no way to 
restrict § 3B1.3 to airport employees using their security 
access to commit crimes but not to workers at other facilities 
with areas off-limits to the general public.  The Guidelines do 
not warrant, or permit, such an expansion, and its 
commentary is binding upon us.  I respectfully dissent.  
